Thursday, January 23, 2014

Bet Din v Secular Court

Parshat Mishpatim

by Rabbi Avi Billet

Many commentaries discuss the opening word of our Parsha, wondering what to make of the word "V'Eileh" – and these are – "Hamishpatim…" the laws which are to be placed before the Jewish people. 

The Medrash Tanchuma, for example, notes the difference between if the word begins or does not begin with a "Vov," which serves as the conjunction "and." Quoting Rabbi Abahu in the name of Rabbi Yosi ben Zimra, the Midrash records how when the letter vov does not appear what came before is not relevant to the here-and-now because a new narrative is being introduced. On the other hand, when the vov is present, the conjunction serves to unite what came before with what follows – in some cases even adding information to glorify a previous text.

 We had previously learned that in Marah (15:25), God had placed "a law and a statute" before the people, and now Moshe was being told, "And these are the laws you should [also] place before them." The latter builds on the former.

 The Midrash goes on to explain that the term "lifneihem" (before them) is literally meant to instruct that these laws apply "before a court made up of [Jews]" and not before idolaters.

 The Midrash asks, "How do we know that two Jewish litigants who have a need to settle a matter in court, who know that they can get the same result in front of a non-Jewish court [as in front of a Bet Din] have a mandate to go to the Jewish court? Because it says, "Before them (the Jewish court)" which means and not before the non-Jewish court.

 It really is a simple formula, perhaps no different than understanding the rules of Shabbos, and why rabbis to this day will have a problem accepting some Jews as valid witnesses on important documents such as a ketubah or a get.

The party line is that a person who violates the Shabbos (and of course there are loose definitions of this, just as much as there are hard definitions of this) is viewed as having denied that God created the world in 6 days and rested on the 7th, the acts we emulate when we keep Shabbos. How can a person who denies God's role in the world serve as a witness on a document that testifies to God's law?

Similarly, the Midrash argues, a person who chooses not to go to a Bet Din is denying God's role in the world, and ultimately His Torah, which instructed you to settle these monetary matters "in-house."

A parable is utilized to drive the message home. Imagine two scenarios in which a doctor treats a patient. In the first case, the doctor examines the patient and instructs the family to feed him whatever he wants. For the second patient, the doctor gives him a very specific diet. When asked why he gave the two patients such different treatments, the doctor replied that the first one has no chance for survival. Why restrict his enjoyment when nothing will help him? The second one, on the other hand, can get better with a very careful diet. Why exacerbate his problem if we can fix it?

This, the Midrash explains is the perspective we ought to have regarding "their laws." Invoking a passage in Yirmiyahu (10:3) and Yechezkel (20:25) the Tanchuma declares a difference between the righteousness of the Torah's laws (the food which will help the patient) versus those of the general society (which will do no harm because the patient is lost anyway). The Torah's laws, for example, declare that they give us a foundation "to live with them." (Vayikra 18:5)

Following all of these laws, including to bring your court cases before a Jewish court will bring about the fulfillment of Yeshayahu 1:26-7 and 56:1, promises for a time when the judges are returned to the place where they belong, at the high court in Jerusalem.

 This Midrashic passage is one of the sources addressing the halakha of the incumbency to utilize the Bet Din, most notably in monetary cases.

 I will not be the one to say that the legal system in the United States is unfair. It is imperfect, as is every legal system, and certainly in the scheme of history, it attempts to be one of the more just legal systems humanity has every put together.

 It also opens doors for rulings which defy logic – lawsuits in which millions of dollars are awarded to litigants, custody battles in which the decision regarding what is "best for the child" is not always so clear, as well as some "no exceptions" rulings which make it to the newspapers every now and then, in which it is clear that bureaucracy is dictating policy, with the human element being removed from the equation.

 This is not to say that the rabbis who sit on a Bet Din are omnipotent, nor that they are always right, nor that "any" Bet Din could take on "any" case. There are Bet Dins which pride themselves on a certain expertise, and guided by Torah and Halakha, they do as decent a job (if not better) than a secular court in their arbitration duties. But even a Bet Din is made up of imperfect humans.

It is the responsibility of the Jew who observes Halakha to always make Bet Din the first stop, in financial suits and civil suits. The right Bet Din might even declare, "We can help you until a certain point, and if you are unsatisfied, you have the legal system of the State."

Hopefully, however, the litigants can come to court looking to do what's right. And with the guidance of the Bet Din, harmony can be achieved as the Mishnah in Avot (1:8) is fulfilled when "they accept the ruling."

No comments:

Post a Comment